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RECENT DECISIONS
Torts--Duty of Building Owner under Wisconsin Safe Place Statute
to Persons on Adjacent Sidewalk-Plaintiff was walking on a public
sidewalk adjacent to a store building with no intention of entering the
building when a glass block fell from the front of the building and
struck and injured her. Action was commenced against A, the owner
of the building; B, the occupant; C, the general contractor; and E, the
sub-contractor, to recover damages. The case was tried on the theory
that the defendants failed to construct and maintain the building so as
to render it "safe" under the provisions of the Wisconsin safe-place
statute.' Plaintiff recovered judgment against defendants B, C, and E.
Held: The judgment was reversed on the ground that the safe-place
statute applies only to such portions of the interior of a building as are
used or held out to be used by the public or employees and does not
extend to protect persons on the adjacent sidewalks. Delaney v. Supreme
Inv. Co., 29 N.W. (2d) 754, (Wisconsin, 1947).
This case is the first to decide the question as to whether the pedes-
trian on the adjacent sidewalk can be brought within the protection of
the "safe-place statute." It is surprising that this question has not been
presented before under a statute now thirty-seven years old. This stat-
ute for some purposes will be construed liberally, 2 but the court has
refused to extend it to impose any duty on property owners beyond
that already imposed by the common law unless such "statute clearly
and beyond any reasonable doubt expresses such purposes by language
that is clear, unambiguous and peremptory."3
The statute, upon which the claim is based, states:
"...Every employer and every owner of a place of employment
or a public building now or hereafter constructed shall so con-
struct, repair or maintain such place of employment or public
building .. .as to render the same safe."' 4
The statutes define the word "safe" as follows:
"The term "safe" or "safety" as applied to an employment or
place of employment or a public building, shall mean such free-
dom from danger to the life, health, safety or welfare of em-
ployees or frequenters, or the public, or tenants, or firemen, and
such reasonable means of notification, egress and escape in case
of fire, and such freedom from danger to adjacent buildings or
Section 101.06, Wisconsin Statutes (1945).
2 Sadowski v. Thomas Furnace Co., 157 Wis. 443, 146 N.W. 770 (1914).
3 Delaney v. Supreme Inv. Co., 29 N.W. (2d) 754 at 757 (1947). To same effect
see Sullivan v. School District, 179 Wis. 502, 191 N.W. 1020 (1923), Wiscon-
sin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 233 Wis. 467, 290 N.W. 199
(1940).
4Supra, fn. 1.
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other property, as the nature of the employment, place of em-
ployment, or public building, will reasonably permit."5
This definition indicates that the safety provisions were meant to
cover "employees or frequenters, or the public, or tenants, or fire-
men",r but this definition contains the only reference to the "public"
which reasonably could be construed as an indication of a protected
class. Looking further into the definitions contained in the statute, it
appears that only the words "employee" and "frequenter" are defined:
"The term "employee" shall mean and include every person who
may be required or directed by any employer, in consideration
of direct or indirect gain or profit, to engage in any employment,
or to go or work or be at any time in any place of employment."
7
"The term "frequenter" shall mean and include every person,
other than an employee, who may go in or be in a place of em-
ployment, or public building under circumstances which render
him other than a trespasser."8
It can be inferred from the above statutes, that since the word
"public" was not defined, the intent was that members of the public,
to be protected, must fall within one of the classes that was defined. It
also seems a fair inference that the legislature intended only persons
in the building to be included in the protected classes. Both statutes
use the word "in" in limiting the defined classes, namely frequenters
and employees. Because of the evident ambiguity and indefiniteness of
language of the "safe-place statute," it reasonably follows that the
Court was justified in deciding that a person on the adjacent sidewalk
in front of the building, such as the plaintiff in the case at bar, was not
within the class of persons meant to be protected by the statute.
While it may be said that the owner of the building owes a duty
to passers-by, the degree of care required there is somewhat less than
that required under the "safe-place statute", and to hold an owner lia-
ble to all members of the public for injuries sustained anywhere around
the outside of his building would be extreme and unjustified by any
clear language in the statute. It has been held that the duty of the
owner of a building, under the statute, to maintain the building in a
safe condition applies only to such portions of a building as are held
out to be used by the public.9 To say that the outside walls and the
sidewalk are held out to be used by the public as a part of the building
would be unreasonable in the absence of clear legislative language re-
quiring such interpretation.
5 Section 101.01 (11), Wisconsin Statutes (1945).
6 Supra, fn. 5.
7 Section 101.01 (4), Wisconsin Statutes (1945).
8 Section 101.01 (5), Wisconsin Statutes (1945).
9 Grossenbach v. Devonshire Realty Co., 218 Wis. 633, 261 N.W. 509 (1935).
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However, the mere fact that this type of case does not fall under
the "safe-place statute" does not relieve the owner from liability under
doctrines of common law negligence, nor does it prevent the application
of res ipsa loquitur. Although the owner of a building is not an insurer
to those in and around his building, he is bound to use reasonable care
in construction and maintenance in order to avoid injuries to the public
which fall within the range of foreseeable harm as defined at com-
mon law.'0
SAMUEL WEITZEN
Torts--Liabilty under Federal Employers' Liability Act-The plain-
tiff brought suit as administrator of the estate of Peter Anastis against
the Erie Railroad Co., for wrongful death under the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act. The decedent had been employed by the defendant
as a yard foreman since 1913, and for several years had been hard of
hearing. On November 22, 1944, which was a clear day, the decedent
with his gang was working in the Youngstown, Ohio, yards of the de-
fendant. The tracks in this yard ran in a general east and west direc-
tion and a toolhouse was located just south of the tracks. At 12:10 the
decedent and his men left their place of work to go to lunch, which
they always ate in the toolhouse. About that time a regular freight
train of the defendant came into the yard and stopped about where the
men had been working. This was the only engine in the yard when the
men stopped working. One of the decedent's men testified that just
before the decedent reached the toolhouse he turned and walked across
the tracks in a northerly direction, while the men entered the toolhouse
where they ate their lunch and talked together. This witness further
testified that the door of the toolhouse remained open, but he heard no
movement of trains or bells or whistles sounding. After lunch the men
went to look for their foreman and found his body lying across the
tracks about seven hundred feet west of the point where he had last
been seen. How he traveled that seven hundred feet, whether by foot
or on a moving train, did not appear. No one saw the accident. There
was no evidence as to flow the decedent met his death except that he
was run over by one of the defendant's trains, presumably by the one
which was in the yard and departed during the thirty minutes which
elapsed between the time the decedent was last seen and the time his
body was found. The plaintiff contended that the evidence showed the
defendant negligent in not maintaining a lookout and in not giving a
signal of warning. The District Court directed the jury to return a
verdict for the defendant. From this verdict the plaintiff appealed.
10 Harper on Torts, Chapter 7.
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